ABSTRACT: Building information modeling (BIM) is significantly influencing the way in which building and engineering projects are being planned, designed, constructed and maintained. It has been widely advocated that BIM will significantly reduce design and construction errors as well improve project cost and schedule. There is a lack of empirical research about the underlying 'latent conditions' contributing to error, which has resulted in a Bad Apple Theory of human error becoming ingrained within BIM research and practice. Changes to the way BIM is viewed as an error reduction tool are required if it is to significantly improve project performance. The paper proposes a systemic model for BIM implementation so that errors can be reduced. As a result of reducing errors subsequent rework, accidents and failures will also be reduced.
INTRODUCTION
At present there is limited theoretical underpinning as to the causal nature of human errors in design and construction [9] . The suggestion that BIM will reduce human errors during design is therefore misleading, considering the array of exogenous and endogenous variables influencing a designer's cognition and ability to perform tasks [3] . Many design firms, in particular, fail to undertake appropriate design reviews, verifications and audits and as a consequence have limited understanding about errors and their impact on project performance [11] .
In fact, most design and construction firms do not quantify the errors they create (and the subsequent rework) [3, 11] .
Such organizational practices are akin to Bad Apples.
Bearing this in mind, how can design professionals and software vendors claim human errors are reduced by implementing BIM? An over-reliance on BIM may simply mask designers' mistakes, miscalculations, and errors of judgment. Decision making due to faulty, incomplete, or imprecise data can only lead to 'garbage in' [2] . The decision-maker is then confronted with a computer-generated BIM and analyses that could be collected and analyzed in no other way. For precisely this reason, going behind the BIM output is out of the question, even if there is a good reason to suspect possible shortcomings [2] . An over-reliance on the output generated by software can have disastrous consequences. For example, the collapse of a Condeep offshore platform, Sleipner A, which resulted in a total financial loss of US$700 million, was attributed to an over-reliance on computer software [4] .
There is a danger that BIM may become 'gospel' and the underlying latent conditions that influence error generation in construction projects are overlooked. A series of new problems may materialize and become intertwined with those that already exist. This may further blur the epistemological and ontological lenses used to examine ways of ameliorating the productivity and performance of construction. In this paper, it is suggested that a Bad Apple Theory of human error prevails within the construction industry. The way in which organizations view and react to errors can influence how effective the uptake of BIM will be. In aiding the uptake of BIM, a systemic framework that can be used to proactively reduce errors is propagated.
BAD APPLE THEORY
A detailed examination of the nature of human error can be found in Reason [17] . Noteworthy, errors are not a cause of an event but a symptom of a much deeper problem within a system [17] . In this paper, the concept of a Bad Apple Theory of human error is used to provide an ameliorated understanding of the environment within which construction organizations operate and why BIM does not reduce errors. A Bad Apple Theory of human error fundamentally assumes that [5] :
 complex systems such as construction projects fail due to the unpredictable behavior of people;  human errors cause accidents; and  failures are unexpected.
Research has sought to examine people's experiences and perceptions of design error incidents that occurred in construction projects [11, 12] . A review of the responses provided by design consultants revealed that most errors could have been prevented [11, 12] . The reasons for errors occurring included: a short-cut was taken and dimensions were not checked; the architect did not provide enough information; and the architect did not pay enough attention to the client's brief. Such perceived design error causes were found to be common, and on face value appear simple to rectify. Such simplicity, however, is misleading. Behind every error event there is often a deeper and more meaningful narrative about the organizational system within which people work. For example:
 new tools and technology can modify error opportunities and pathways to failure [11] ;  people reconcile different and often competing goals simultaneously (i.e. profit v complete documentation) [11, 12] ; and  production pressure influences people's trade-offs, making normal or acceptable what was previously irregular or unsafe [7, 11, 13] . between people and some aspect of a larger system (e.g., a human-machine interface). They are generally readily apparent and almost always involve an operator or someone at the coalface of a task [17] .
Unreliable and incompetent staff may cause design errors [9] . In response, managers may endeavor to protect their work environments and professional standards from the vagaries' of human behavior by:
 ensuring unreliable and incompetent staff (i.e. Bad But procedural over-specification is likely to widen the gap between procedures and practice, rather than narrow it.
New procedures can also get buried in masses of regulatory paperwork.
It is widely assumed that the introduction of BIM will reduce human errors. After all, planning, design, construction and maintenance, as well as whole life cycle costs can be examined in detail. As a result the work previously undertaken individually by project team members is integrated and coordinated; the potential for error is thus perceived to be controlled. BIM technology does not remove errors, but merely relocates, changes or even hides them. What BIM does is to provide practitioners and projects with new capabilities, but it also brings new complexities too, which include:
 an increase in operational demands by allowing projects to be driven faster (i.e. earlier completion may be expected);  an increased need for coordination and integration and a subtle shift toward using integrated procurement arrangements;  forcing practitioners to tailor BIM in pragmatic ways to make it work in 'real practice';  a requirement for people to obtain more knowledge and 
BIM SOFTWARE VENDORS
A number of BIM software vendors such as Autodesk Inc, Bentley Systems Inc, Graphisoft ® , Nemetschek AG, have their own self interests at heart, as they actively promote the use of their own applications. Software vendors and design consultants who are using BIM claim that it "enhances the quality of the construction documents by reducing human error as well as motivating architects to think through the building process for a more finalized project in the design phase" [1]. This statement is contrary to the findings of both widespread and established empirical research that has examined human error [7, 17] .
Fundamentally, it is impossible to design technological systems to eliminate human errors [6] .
There is a hidden danger that practitioners may view BIM as being a 'magic bullet' that can miraculously improve organizational and project performance when gaudy animations and visualizations are used to over-sell the product. Once technology is installed, however, problems may begin to materialize [14] : the promises of BIM may manifest as the organization is forced to comply with the demands of technology. The abundance of Enterprise Resource Planning failures provides convincing testimony of purchasers being swept away by the advertised benefits of implementing software applications espoused by vendors. After all, vendors are selling a product, and make carte blanche promises that may not be achievable to every purchaser [8] . After technology solutions are deployed within an organization, vendors often refer to the process as being a 'death march' [15] . This term describes the upheaval and distress that the technology causes to the organization. Software vendors and their partners will also offer much in the way of assurances about their interest in providing assistant to organization with 'change management' and 'training', but this is inadequate for what is required to attain the benefits that are often espoused.
SYSTEMIC BIM IMPLEMENTATION MODEL
It is impossible to design technological systems to eliminate human errors [6] . Systems should therefore be designed that focus on behavior and methods of working during all phases of a project's life cycle so as to reduce opportunities for human error. Practice' can be used to share experiences and knowledge so that new approaches to problems can be fostered [10] . In particular, the situated practice that people are exposed to can be utilized as a rich source of knowledge formation. 
